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The Death of Oakes: Time for a
Rights-Specific Approach?
Christopher D. Bredt and Heather K. Pessione*

I. INTRODUCTION
In its seminal 1986 decision in R. v. Oakes,1 the Supreme Court of
Canada first promulgated a framework for the application of section 1 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 From the outset, the
Oakes test was intended to be a “stringent standard of justification” to be
applied in a common or universal manner to all Charter breaches. This
“one size fits all” approach has proven to be problematic. In short,
attempts to shoehorn all section 1 analysis into an Oakes framework have
led to a dilution of the Oakes test, and a context-driven and unpredictable
approach. The thesis of this paper is that the time has come to abandon
the Oakes test, and develop in its place a rights-specific approach to
section 1 analysis.3
To develop this thesis, the paper first reviews briefly the Oakes test
as it was originally articulated. The next section describes how the Oakes
test has been eroded through definitional balancing, diluted through the
contextual approach and the weakening of the evidentiary requirement,
and in some cases not applied at all. We then review the movement towards a rights-specific approach in Israel, and the Dagenais/Mentuck
*
Christopher Bredt is a senior partner in the Commercial Litigation group at Borden
Ladner Gervais LLP in Toronto, and the National Chair of the Firm’s Public Law Group. Heather
Pessione is a partner in the Commercial Litigation and Health Sector Services groups at Borden
Ladner Gervais LLP in Toronto, and the Co-ordinator of the Firm’s Public Law Group.
1
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
Some of the ideas developed in the paper were considered in Christopher D. Bredt &
Adam M. Dodek, “The Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)
175 and C. Bredt, “The Right to Equality and Oakes: Time for Change” (2010) 27 N.J.C.L. 59.
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test, wherein the Supreme Court has explicitly abandoned Oakes. In the
final section, we argue that the Supreme Court’s struggles with Oakes are
inherent in any attempt to apply a universal approach to the myriad of
rights protected by the Charter, and conclude that transparency, predictability and fairness dictate that the Court adopt an explicitly rightsspecific approach to section 1 balancing.

II. THE OAKES TEST: “A STRINGENT STANDARD
OF JUSTIFICATION”
Section 1 of the Charter provides that it “guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.4
The Canadian approach — to include an explicit limitation clause rather
than relying on the courts to shape the analysis with respect to the balancing of competing interests — is consistent with international human
rights conventions,5 and is in contrast to the American Bill of Rights,
which does not contain an explicit balancing clause.6
The wording of section 1 was a matter of some debate during the
drafting of the Charter. A previous iteration of section 1 allowed for limits on rights that were “generally accepted in a free and democratic
society”.7 The addition of “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified” to
the final text of section 1 reflects the intention that limitations on Charter
rights be held to what the Supreme Court later referred to as a “stringent
standard of justification”.8
Although the Charter came into effect in 1982, the Supreme Court of
Canada did not provide a comprehensive framework for the justification
of limitations on Charter rights under section 1 until 1986. In Oakes,
Dickson C.J.C. articulated the four-part “section 1 test” which has continued to be applied for over 25 years, and, as Hogg has put it, “has taken
on some of the character of holy writ”:9

4

Charter, supra, note 2, s. 1.
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell),
at 38-2 and 38-3 [hereinafter “Hogg”].
6
Id., at 38-3.
7
E. Mendes, “The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference in the
Context of Section 1” (2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47, at 51.
8
Oakes, supra, note 1, at para. 65.
9
Hogg, supra, note 5, at 38-17.
5
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To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied.
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a
Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be “of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or
freedom”. The standard must be high in order to ensure that objectives
which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free and
democratic society do not gain s. 1 protection. It is necessary, at a
minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and
substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be
characterized as sufficiently important.
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the
party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and
demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test”.
Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on
the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the
interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in
my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First,
the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on
irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to
the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the
objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the
right or freedom in question”. Third, there must be a proportionality
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting
the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been
identified as of “sufficient importance”.10

A few points with respect to the Oakes test merit consideration at this
stage.
First, although Oakes requires that that a government actor which
seeks to uphold a violation of rights satisfy a four-part test, as Hogg has
observed, it is the third step of the test — “minimum impairment”11 —
upon which nearly all section 1 cases have turned.12

10

Oakes, supra, note 1, at paras. 69-70 (citations omitted).
Hogg, supra, note 5, cautions that it is not accurate to describe the test as the “minimal
impairment” test, “because the word ‘minimal’ carries the connotation of trivial or slight, and a
justified limit on a Charter right might be quite a severe limit on the right” (at 38-36). As is
summarized later in this paper, the dilution of the Oakes test has clearly transformed Dickson
C.J.C.’s “minimal impairment” test into a “minimum impairment” test.
12
Hogg, id., at 38-18.
11
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Second, there is a tension in the case itself regarding the universal
applicability of Oakes. Although the test is styled (and has subsequently
been interpreted) as a test to be applied every time that section 1 is
engaged, Dickson C.J.C. recognized that the test had to maintain some
flexibility in order to respond to the variable rights and freedoms
engaged by the Charter, and the factual scenarios which will be the
subject of section 1 justification:
With respect to the third component, it is clear that the general effect of
any measure impugned under s. 1 will be the infringement of a right or
freedom guaranteed by the Charter; this is the reason why resort to s. 1
is necessary. The inquiry into effects must, however, go further. A wide
range of rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter, and an
almost infinite number of factual situations may arise in respect of
these. Some limits on rights and freedoms protected by the Charter will
be more serious than others in terms of the nature of the right or
freedom violated, the extent of the violation, and the degree to which
the measures which impose the limit trench upon the integral principles
of a free and democratic society. Even if a objective is of sufficient
importance, and the first two elements of the proportionality test are
satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the
deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups will not be
justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must
be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.13

Third, although Dickson C.J.C. described the Oakes test as a “stringent
standard of justification”,14 just a few months later in Edwards Books,15 the
minimum impairment arm of the test had already been softened. In that
case, Dickson C.J.C. amended the “as little as possible” language with
respect to least drastic means to “as little as is reasonably possible”.16 As
we describe in greater detail below, this was but the first step in the
dilution of Oakes.

13
14
15
16

Oakes, supra, note 1, at para. 71.
Id., at para. 65.
R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 126.
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III. THE FALL OF OAKES: DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS
The notion that the Oakes test has been diluted from the outset has
been described by Sujit Choudhry as the “dominant narrative” with respect to its legacy.17 In this section, we discuss a number of examples
which demonstrate how this dilution has taken place. First, the Court has
consistently engaged in a balancing of interests in defining the scope of
the rights protected by the Charter, rather than leaving it to the section 1
analysis. Second, the “stringent standard of justification” promised in
Oakes has been softened, both through the use of a contextual approach
to section 1 analysis, and through the weakening of the evidentiary
threshold required to support a section 1 justification. Finally, in certain
contexts, the Court has expressly allowed for the section 1 analysis to be
done without applying Oakes at all.
1. Definitional Balancing
The language and structure of the Charter dictate that the
determination of whether a right has been infringed is confined to the first,
“definitional” stage of the analysis, and that balancing rights and freedoms
against reasonable limits on those rights and freedoms is undertaken
separately, within the section 1 analysis. However, notwithstanding this
clear distinction between definition/breach and justification, the Court has
increasingly moved the justification analysis into the definitional stage of
its Charter analysis.
In some cases, such a shift has been the inevitable result of language
which suggests some balancing in the definition of the right. For example,
section 7 of the Charter provides that: “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Section 8
protects against “unreasonable search and seizure”, and section 9
entrenches the right not to be “arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. Thus, the
language of sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Charter mandate an internal balancing
at the definitional stage of the analysis.18 Given the internal balancing that

17
Sujit Choudhry, “So What is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501.
18
There are other examples: s. 11(a) entrenches the right “to be informed without unreasonable
delay of the specific offence”; s. 11(b) provides for the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”; and
s. 11(d) provides for the right “not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause”.

490

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

takes place at the definition/breach stage of these Charter rights, it is not
surprising that section 1 rarely plays a role in the analysis of these rights, or
that when it does it is duplicative of the analysis of breach.19
However, even where the language of the Charter does not compel
balancing at the definitional stage, the Court often imports a balancing
analysis in determining whether the right has been infringed. The best example of this approach is the Court’s tortured section 15 equality analysis.
(a) Section 15
The Court recently revisited the test for an infringement of section 15(1)
in R. v. Kapp,20 finding that, going forward, the test should consist of the
following questions: (1) Does the law create a distinction based on an
enumerated or analogous ground?; and (2) Does the distinction create a
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotype (i.e., is it discriminatory)? The Court moved away from the “human dignity” analysis
employed in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),21 replacing it with the concept of “discrimination”.
One of the main critiques of the Law test had been that it improperly
shifted balancing and justification from the section 1 analysis to the
section 15 analysis.22 However, despite Kapp the Court has continued to
employ a “contextual analysis” at the definitional stage of the section 15(1)
analysis, and has thereby continued to include the types of considerations
typically included in a section 1 analysis into the definitional stage. In
fact, Hogg has suggested that the second arm of the section 15 test set
out in Kapp “seems to come down to an assessment by the Court of the
legitimacy of the statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using a
listed or analogous ground to accomplish that purpose”.23
In Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),24 the Court recently considered whether multiple different approaches to the calculation of a
19
In Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.), Lamer J. (as he then was) stated that s. 1 could only justify an
infringement of s. 7 in “exceptional circumstances, such as natural disaster, war or epidemic”
(at para. 85). Justice Wilson opined in the same case that s. 1 could never justify an infringement of
s. 7 (at para. 105).
20
[2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.).
21
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).
22
See Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality:
A New Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33.
23
Hogg, supra, note 5, at 55031.
24
[2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.).
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“supplementary” lump sum federal death benefit on the basis of the age
amounted to a violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. The Court held
that the legislation creates a distinction on the basis of age, but does not
create a disadvantage, based on a contextual analysis akin to that set out
by Hogg in his critique of Kapp. The Court held that the purpose of the
benefit, which was only one part of a package of survivor benefits, was
not to provide a long-term income stream for surviving spouses,25 and
the reductions in benefits for survivors aged 65 and older reflected the
fact that a younger group of survivors would have different needs. The
Court concluded that the “package of benefits, viewed as a whole and
over time, does not impose or perpetuate discrimination”.26
Another recent section 15 case, Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation
v. Canada,27 provides a further example of this “contextual approach”. In
Ermineskin, the Court considered whether the payment of oil and gas
royalties to First Nations pursuant to the Indian Act, in contrast with royalty payments to non-Aboriginals, was in violation of section 15 of the
Charter. Again, the Court held that the legislation creates a distinction,
but not a disadvantage, citing an early section 15 case, R. v. Turpin:28
In determining whether there is discrimination on grounds relating to
the personal characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to
look not only at the impugned legislation which has created a
distinction that violates the right to equality but also the larger social,
political and legal context.29

The contextual approach which the Court applies to section 15 jurisprudence clearly duplicates the balancing and justification inherent in the
section 1 analysis. The result of such “definitional balancing” has been to
further marginalize section 1 (and, necessarily, any robust or thoughtful
application of the Oakes test).
Although the Court seems to be making some attempts to address
this issue, most recently in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A.,30 it has not
25

“For younger plan members, the purpose of the supplementary death benefit is to insure
against unexpected death at a time when the deceased member’s surviving spouse would be
unprotected by a pension or entitled to limited pension funds. For older members, the purpose of the
supplementary death benefit is to assist surviving spouses with the costs of the plan member’s last
illness and death.” Id., at para. 5.
26
Id., at para. 81.
27
[2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”].
28
[1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.).
29
Ermineskin, supra, note 27, at para. 193.
30
[2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lola”].
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yet been successful. In that case, A. (“Lola”) applied for a declaration
that certain spousal support and property provisions of the Civil Code of
Québec31 were discriminatory under section 15(1), on the grounds that
those provisions denied de facto spouses protection that was offered to
spouses who were either married or in a civil union.
While the decisions of Abella, Deschamps and LeBel JJ. engaged in
significant public policy analysis at the definition/breach stage, McLachlin
C.J.C. preferred to undertake much of the same equality analysis under
section 1. She argued that public policy considerations are more
appropriate to a proportionality analysis than a discrimination analysis:
[I]t is important to maintain the analytical distinction between s. 15 and
s. 1. While the public policy basis for legislation has a limited relevance
to the s. 15 analysis, it is central to the s. 1 inquiry. This flows from the
two-stage model of constitutional review inherent in the Charter.32

Chief Justice McLachlin therefore preferred to separate the question
of whether a disadvantage arising from a legislated distinction amounts
to discrimination (properly answered under section 15) from whether that
discrimination was reasonable when balanced against other public policy
considerations (properly answered under section 1).
This approach may appear on an initial review to be a step in the right
direction, as it addresses some of the concerns with respect to duplication.
However, it remains to be seen how this aspect of Lola will be applied going forward; it is likely that most section 15 cases will continue analyze
public policy considerations primarily at the definition/breach stage of the
analysis rather than in the analysis of justification under section 1. In any
event, Lola fails to shift other aspects of equality balancing, apart from
public policy concerns, to the section 1 analysis.
(b) Section 2(b) — Public Forum Analysis
Generally speaking, the Court has taken a robust approach to the
section 1 justification analysis in freedom of expression cases, due to the
broad definition of section 2(b) of the Charter, which encompasses any
attempt to convey meaning. As a result of the broad definition of the

31

S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
Lola, supra, note 30, at para. 421 (citation omitted). Although disagreeing on the result,
Abella J. concurred that the reasonableness of the distinction was a question properly left for s. 1.
32
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right, section 2(b) cases have been at the forefront of section 1 analysis.33
However, an exception to this approach is the Court’s analysis of “public
forum” issues — the right of freedom of expression on public property.
In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,34 the Court
confronted the public forum issue for the first time, and split on the
appropriate stage of the analysis to balance the competing interests. The
majority of the Court35 adopted an analytical approach that required that
the balancing inherent in public forum cases — between the interests of
the individual and the interests of government — take place at the definition/breach stage, as well as at the section 1 stage, of the analysis. Only
L’Heureux-Dubé J. would have taken an approach that mandated that the
balancing take place as part of the section 1 analysis.
More recently, in Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc.,36 the
Court reviewed and revised its analytical approach to public forum
issues. The Court reiterated that despite the fact that “all expressive
content is worthy of protection, the method or location of the expression
may not be”.37 In order to perform this “screening” analysis, the Court
engages in significant balancing at the definition/breach stage, and
develops a test for future application which the Court affirms is the
responsibility of the Charter claimant to satisfy. The Court goes on to
address potential concerns with this approach:
Another concern is whether the proposed test screens out expression
which merits protection, on the one hand, or admits too much clearly
unprotected expression on the other. Our jurisprudence requires broad
protection at the s. 2(b) stage [but] also reflects the reality that some places
must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b). People must know
where they can and cannot express themselves and governments should
not be required to justify every exclusion or regulation of expression
under s. 1. As six of seven judges of this Court agreed in Committee for
the Commonwealth of Canada, the test must provide a preliminary
screening process. Otherwise, uncertainty will prevail and governments

33

See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),
[1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”].
34
[1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.).
35
Id., per Lamer C.J.C., La Forest J.
36
[2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.).
37
Id., at para. 60 (emphasis in original).
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will be continually forced to justify restrictions which, viewed from the
perspective of history and common sense, are entirely appropriate.38

However, this is precisely the function of the section 1 analysis: to
ensure that the government bears the onus of justifying restrictions on the
rights and freedoms protected by the Charter.
It is important to note that the effect of the Court’s use of definitional
balancing is to shift the evidentiary burden from the government to Charter claimants. This shift of the evidentiary burden is accompanied by the
Court’s willingness to dilute the government’s evidentiary burden at the
section 1 stage, which is discussed below. Together, the result is to substantially weaken Oakes’ “stringent standard of justification”.
2. Dilution of the Strictness of Oakes
(a) The Contextual Approach to Section 1
The emphasis on context that the Court has imported into the
definition/breach stage of the analysis is mirrored in the contextualization
of the section 1 analysis. The approach of the Court has been to recognize
that a protected right or freedom may be assigned a different value
depending on the context of the alleged breach. This approach to the
application of the Oakes test originates in a decision of Wilson J. in
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),39 where she wrote:
The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of
the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the
relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems to be
more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.40

The contextual approach was quickly adopted by the Court and remains an integral part of its section 1 analysis. In many cases, the
contextual approach is expressly used as a means of diluting the stringent
standard of justification otherwise required by Oakes.
Further evidence of “contextual” balancing in the section 1 analysis is
found in the Court’s willingness to defer to legislative choices in a number

38
39
40

Id., at para. 79.
Supra, note 33.
Id., at 1355-56.
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of circumstances, starting with its decision in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(Attorney General).41 In that case, the Court drew a distinction between
cases where the legislature was attempting to strike a balance between the
claims of competing groups and those cases where “the government is best
characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has
been infringed”.42 The Court’s rationale for this distinction was that the
government is well-placed to analyze the claims of competing groups, but
the courts are better positioned to analyze disputes between the
government and individuals. On this basis, the Court purported to justify a
higher level of scrutiny in so-called “singular antagonist” cases, and a
higher level of deference in cases where competing groups are in
competition for scarce resources. Regardless of whether there is a
legitimate policy which underpins this distinction,43 there is no question
that the Court’s explicit recognition of deference to the legislature in
certain circumstances has weakened the application of the Oakes test.
(b) Weakening of the Evidentiary Requirement
As noted above, the shifting of the balancing analysis from section 1
to the definition/breach stage also shifts the onus from the government to
the claimant. However, this is not the only means that the court has
employed to weaken the strictness of the Oakes test. The Court has also
significantly reduced the strictness of the evidentiary standard at the
section 1 stage of the analysis through the development of a “reasoned
apprehension of harm” test.44

41

Supra, note 33.
Id., at 994.
43
Arguably, there is none. The paradigm case of the “singular antagonist” would appear to
be the criminal law. However, there is frequently balancing of interests and competing demands in
Charter review of criminal provisions. In subsequent criminal law cases such as R. v. Keegstra,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) (a challenge to the hate speech provisions in the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46), the Court did not make reference to the stricter requirement
when the state is acting as a singular antagonist.
44
In other contexts, the Court has required that the government meet a higher threshold in
order to justify a Charter breach. For example, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), the government was held to a standard
of “demonstrable justification”, and in R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”] the government was held to a standard of “convincing evidence”.
The shifting sands of the s. 1 evidentiary standard provide a further concern with respect to certainty
and predictability, particularly for Charter claimants, but also for the Crown.
42
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A good example of this approach is the Court’s decision in R.
v. Butler.45 In that case, the Court considered whether the Criminal Code
definition of “obscenity” infringed section 2(b) of the Charter. It held that
the definition was an infringement of section 2(b), but that the
infringement was justified under section 1. In Butler, the Court concluded
that, in the face of inconclusive social science evidence, Parliament was
entitled to proceed on the basis of a “reasoned apprehension of harm”,
and relieved the government of its obligation to prove a clear link
between obscenity and harm to society on a balance of probabilities as
would normally be required in order to justify a breach under section 1.46
Another example of this approach is the Court’s decision in Harper
v. Canada (Attorney General),47 which considered limits on third party
spending in federal elections. The Attorney General offered no evidence
to support a connection between third party spending and electoral fairness. Despite this lacuna, the majority framed the analysis as follows:
The legislature is not required to provide scientific proof based on
concrete evidence of the problem it seeks to address in every case.
Where the court is faced with inconclusive or competing social science
evidence relating the harm to the legislature’s measures, the court may
rely on a reasoned apprehension of that harm.
…
On balance, the contextual factors favour a deferential approach to
Parliament in determining whether the third party advertising expense
limits are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Given the difficulties in measuring this harm, a reasoned apprehension
that the absence of third party election advertising limits will lead to
electoral unfairness is sufficient.48

45

[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Butler”].
Butler was applied in R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) and
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) to again relieve the government of the usual burden of demonstrating harm
and to support a s. 1 justification of infringements of s. 2(b).
47
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.).
48
Id., at paras. 77, 88 (emphasis added).
46
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3. By-Passing Oakes: Charter Values
In Doré v. Barreau du Québec,49 the Supreme Court recently affirmed
that Charter analysis can proceed in some circumstances without applying
Oakes at all.
In Doré, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tribunal
des professions that a disciplinary reprimand issued by the Barreau du
Québec’s Disciplinary Council for a discourteous private letter sent to a
sitting judge was a reasonable limitation of a lawyer’s right to freedom of
expression.
Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, proposed that
administrative decisions that undertook a proportionality analysis of
Charter rights were to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, using
administrative law principles, rather than scrutinized on the basis of the
Oakes test. She notes that this is consistent with the Court’s approach in
previous cases to the application of Charter values to common law
principles, where no Oakes analysis has been required.50 This suggests that
the Oakes test will not be applied when a Charter question is raised with
respect to the exercise of discretion in an administrative forum, as it need
not be applied by either the administrative body or in subsequent judicial
review. Given the wide jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to decide
Charter questions, as was recently affirmed in R. v. Conway,51 this is a
significant departure from the supposed universality of the Oakes test.52

IV. TIME TO ABANDON OAKES — TOWARD
A RIGHTS-SPECIFIC APPROACH
1. International Perspectives
Instead of trying to apply Oakes universally to the section 1 analysis,
the Supreme Court of Canada should begin to construct rights-specific
section 1 tests to suit the context of the various rights and freedoms protected by the Charter. This has been the approach taken to the
49

[2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R 395 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 39. See also R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.).
51
[2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.).
52
The Court in Doré also affirms that administrative law decisions on Charter values will
be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness rather than correctness. This reinforces the gap between
the application of the “strict standard” required by Oakes and the deferential approach taken to the
review of the exercise of statutory discretion in Doré.
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interpretation of the United States Bill of Rights — although the Bill of
Rights does not contain an explicit justification clause akin to section 1
of the Charter, the American judiciary clearly and explicitly engages in
balancing of competing interests in determining whether fundamental
rights have been infringed. Importantly, the balancing that takes place in
the American jurisprudence is rights-specific — there is no attempt to
develop a universal approach.53
A similar approach is emerging in the Israeli jurisprudence. Justice
Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has written about the similarity between the limitation clauses in the Canadian
and Israeli human rights provisions, noting that the Israeli provision was
influenced by section 1 of the Charter.54 He notes that although Israel
initially followed Canada’s lead and applied a universal justification test,
regardless of the right invoked by a Charter litigant, the Supreme Court
of Israel has more recently applied a rights-specific approach to justification. As he puts it:
[F]or the purposes of safeguarding human rights against limitations by
law, not all rights are of equal status. The status of the right to human
dignity is not the same as the status of a property right, and, within the
framework of the same right, the extent of protection from limitation
may vary. Thus, for example, the extent of protection from limitation of
the freedom of commercial expression in the framework of a specific
aspect of a right (such as political speech), a limitation upon the core of
the right is not the same as a limitation upon its outer rim.55

President Barak proposes a proportionality analysis (at the fourth
stage of Oakes) which explicitly acknowledges a rights-specific hierarchy. However, his approach has been criticized on the basis that a focus
on the fourth step of the Oakes test does not resolve one of the central
concerns with a universal section 1 analysis: the “balancing” it calls for
remains too subjective and lacks rigor and certainty.56

53

For example, certain grounds of discrimination, such as race, are strictly scrutinized,
while others, such as age, are typically held to a lower standard of scrutiny.
54
Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 369,
at 370.
55
Id., at 371-72.
56
See Sara Weinrib, “The Emergence of the Third Step of the Oakes Test in Alberta
v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 68(2) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 77-97, at para. 53.
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2. The Dagenais/Mentuck Model
In some instances, the Supreme Court has already adopted a rightsspecific approach. A good example of this is the Dagenais/Mentuck test,
which was developed and is applied in the context of section 2(b) cases
which engage the open court principle. The Court explicitly acknowledged in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.57 and R. v. Mentuck58
that the balancing of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial
requires a specially designed test in instances where a publication ban is
sought. The test dictates that a publication ban should only be ordered
where it is shown to be necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to
the fairness of the trial, and where reasonably available alternative measures would not prevent the risk. In addition, the test dictates that “the
salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious impact
the ban has on free expression”.59
The Dagenais/Mentuck test reflects the principles underlying the
Oakes test — necessity and proportionality — while recognizing that
particular circumstances require a context-specific test, and provides
Charter litigants with a more predictable, transparent and coherent approach to the justification analysis. It therefore provides a helpful model
which the Court may look to in developing context-specific approaches
tailored to other rights protected by the Charter.60

57

[1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”].
Supra, note 44.
59
Id.; Dagenais, supra, note 57. The Court recently applied the Dagenais/Mentuck
approach to the balancing of the open court principle and freedom of religion in R. v. S. (N.), [2012]
S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.), where it considered the right of the complainant in a
sexual assault case to testify wearing a niqab and the right of the accused to a fair trial.
60
A similar rights-specific approach to s. 1 analysis of s. 2(b) Charter claims is proposed by
Chanakya Sethi in “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression Under the
Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal 21. Sethi reviews the s. 2(b) analysis undertaken in Charter cases and
concludes that the Court has suggested a hierarchy among different types of expression, with laws
that limit political expression being strictly scrutinized, and laws that draw distinctions on the basis
of commercial expression being held to a less rigorous standard of scrutiny. Sethi goes on to propose
a s. 1 test which reflects these varied approaches, with three tiers of scrutiny of limits on expressive
rights: “Each of these tiers can be applied under section 1 to ratchet up — or down — the level of
scrutiny given by courts to proposed limits on the right, including the appropriate level of deference
given to Parliament” (at para. 42).
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V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE COURT’S
STRUGGLE WITH OAKES
The examples discussed above — the Court’s use of definitional
balancing, the contextual approach to definitional balancing and to
section 1, the weakening and shifting evidentiary requirements, and the
deference afforded by the Court — demonstrate that Oakes as a universal
standard is not working. Implicit in the Court’s jurisprudence is a
recognition that not all rights are the same, and the factors that are
relevant to the balancing of competing interests differ accordingly. Thus,
any attempt to revert to a universal and stringent application of Oakes
will devolve into the same fragmented approach that we see today.
The time has come to recognize that a universal approach does not
make sense, and to explicitly abandon Oakes in favour of a rightsspecific approach. Such an approach will enable the Court to tailor its
section 1 analysis to the particular context, and to do so without being
tied to Oakes. The Court is already moving in this direction in specific
areas, as the Dagenais/Mentuck test and its application illustrates.
More importantly, a rights-specific approach will have a salutary effect
on the rule of law. First, the current approach can be unduly complicated
and repetitive — the current section 15 analysis requires that the same
factors be considered both in determining whether section 15 has been
breached, and then again in applying the Oakes analysis. A simpler rightsspecific approach would clearly assist the lower courts as well as Charter
litigants. Second, the current approach lacks transparency and
predictability — in part caused by the Court’s artificial attempt to maintain
the universal application of Oakes, while in fact applying a context
specific approach. A rights-specific approach will require the Court to
more clearly articulate the factors relevant to a section 1 inquiry for each
specific right. The rule of law demands no less.

